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In the recent case of Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange,1 the
California Supreme Court held that a Workmen's Compensation
carrier is liable for damages to an injured employee for its inten-
tional torts committed during investigation of the accident.
This article will discuss the significance and effect of this case
of first impression. Previously carriers had been immune to suit
under these circumstances.
FACTS
Orpha Unruh, a 45 year old supermarket bookkeeper, injured her
back on March 31, 1960, while picking up a bag of coins. Subse-
quently, the doctors provided by the Workmen's Compensation car-
rier operated on her back on four different occasions. During the
first operation, a sponge was left in the patient's back and a mal-
practice suit ensued. Overmedication caused addiction to narcot-
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1947; J.D., Southwestern
University, 1950; practicing attorney since 1951; and member of California
Trial Lawyers Association and American Trial Lawyers Association.
1. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal.3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal.Rptr.
815.
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ics. The fusion did not take and the patient required psychiatric
care.
In 1963, the plaintiff filed an application for a permanent disabil-
ity rating with the then Industrial Accident Commission of the
State of California. The compensation carrier doubted the gen-
uineness of the claimed disability and hired an investigator to
take motion pictures of the applicant. The investigator reported
that Mrs. Unruh stayed in her apartment and did not come out-
doors. Movies could not be taken. The carrier then changed tac-
tics. It hired a handsome investigator who wined and dined the
applicant and expressed a personal interest in her. This in turn
excited an emotional response from the applicant. The investigator
took Mrs. Unruh's hand and led her off to Disneyland. An ac-
complice armed with a camera having a telescopic lens photo-
graphed Mrs. Unruh gingerly paddling an Indian canoe and care-
fully walking across a rope and barrel bridge which the investi-
gator shook furiously. Mrs. Unruh was examined the following
day by defendant's doctor who later saw the movies and con-
cluded the claimant was faking.
At a hearing before the Industrial Accident Commission, Mrs. Un-
ruh frankly admitted to all of the activities in question before she
was informed that movies had been taken or would be shown.
Upon seeing the movies, she felt betrayed and thereafter became
psychotic. She required over a year and a half of hospitalization
which resulted in medical bills of $128,000. Orpha Unruh recov-
ered workmen's compensation benefits for the psychiatric disturb-
ance on the theory that the injury was incidental to the compensa-
tion case.
She also filed a civil suit against the workmen's compensation
carrier, the supervisor of claims and the investigator. The issues
before the court were whether immunity from suit extends to a
compensation carrier's acts against an applicant and if the applicant
should be given a civil remedy. The trial court sustained a de-
murrer to the complaint based on lack of jurisdiction on the theory
that the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board had exclusive
jurisdiction and that the plaintiff was entitled to no more than
compensation benefits. Mrs. Unruh appealed.
The concepts with which the court was concerned were jurisdic-
tion, negligent and intentional torts, wrong without a remedy,
medical as distinguished from non-medical investigation of claims,
double recovery, election of remedies, res judicata and setoff. The
tools with which the court worked included provisions of the Cali-
fornia Labor Code, public policy, a repugnant reaction to outra-
geous conduct, the status concept in California law and the fiction
of dual capacity. As a matter of public policy, an insurance car-
rier should not be allowed to further injure compensation appli-
cants who are already injured. The problem the court faced there-
fore was how to create a remedy which would not subject "the sys-
tem of Workmen's Compensation . . . to a process of partial disin-
tegration".2
Also to be considered was the fact that the misrepresentation by
the investigator as to the interest he represents in an attempt to
secure information has been held to be dishonesty and fraud in
violation of statute.3 To say that the carrier could intentionally,
deliberately and illegally destroy the mentality of a disabled em-
ployee with impunity is shocking. What could happen if the car-
rier had immunity from penalty for such an injury? Some work-
men's compensation cases require rather substantial reserves up
to $300,000 or more. Death benefits are comparatively small. The
overzealous investigator for the Workmen's Compensation carrier
might accidentally convert a case of great magnitude into one of
lesser liability if not held to account.
The real problem in Unruh was to find a solution which would
satisfy the interests of the injured employee, hold the carrier to
its responsibilities, and yet not destroy the integrity of the com-
pensation system.
HISTORY
In a similar factual situation the Florida District Court of Ap-
peal held that an insurance company investigation could be an in-
vasion of privacy.4 The plaintiff in that case brought an action
for personal injuries against the defendant following an automo-
bile accident. The attorney for the defendant employed a private
investigator to conduct a surveillance of the activities of the plain-
tiff, which included the taking of motion pictures. The purpose of
2. Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 737, 342 P.2d 976, 979
(1959).
3. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, §§ 7551(e) & 7553.2 (West 19-); CAL. INS.
CODE, §§ 790.01, 790.02 & 790.03 (West 19-); Wayne v. Bureau of Pvt.
Investigators and Adjusters, Dept. of Prof. & Voc. Stds., 201 Cal. App. 2d
427, 20 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1962); Taylor v. Bureau of Pvt. Investigators & Ad-justers of Calif., 128 Cal. App. 2d 219, 275 P.2d 579 (1954).
4. Tucker v. American Empl. Ins. Co., 171 So. 2d 437, 13 A.L.R.2d 1020
(Fla. 1965).
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the sub rosa investigation was to discover if there was any incon-
sistency between the injuries which the plaintiff alleged and her
actual physical activity. The plaintiff then filed a complaint al-
leging that the defendant wilfully and maliciously caused the plain-
tiff to be "openly followed and shadowed" in such a manner as to
make the plaintiff and the general public aware that she was being
followed which caused her to suffer certain injuries. The defend-
ant filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied. The
Court stated:
The question of whether the investigation of a claimant in a per-
sonal injury case can give rise to this tort has not been answered
in Florida. In considering this question it must be borne in mind
that it is not uncommon for defendants to investigate the plain-
tiffs in order to determine the validity of a claim in a personal
injury case. Because of the public interest in exposing fraudulent
claims, a plaintiff must expect that a reasonable investigation
will be made subsequent tQ the filing of claim. However, there
should be certain limits as to how the investigation is conducted,
because there is also a social utility in not permitting a defendant
to harass or intimidate a plaintiff into settling a claim on less
favorable terms than those which he would voluntarily accept.
(Emphasis added.) 5
An attempt to shadow the plaintiff by snooping around her
house, peeping in her windows, calling at her door under the guise
of being a television salesman and following her closely in public
places was held in Georgia to constitute an actionable invasion of
her right of privacy.6 The Court said that just because the plain-
tiff filed a suit against the defendant's employer for personal in-
juries the defendant had no right to investigate the plaintiff in an
unreasonably obtrusive manner which would disturb the sensibil-
ities of a person with normal reactions.
Allegations that two of the defendant's detectives constantly
watched the plaintiff with binoculars, trespassed upon her property
and peeped into the windows of her home were held in Louisiana
to be sufficient to constitute a cause of action for an invasion of
her right of privacy.7 The court pointed out that the plaintiff
filed a Workmen's Compensation claim against an insurance com-
pany and observed that such company had the right to hire inves-
5. Id. at 438.
6. Pinkerton Nat. Det. Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119, 13 A.L.R.3d 1026 (1963).
7. Souder v. Pendleton Dets., Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (L.A. App. 1956).
tigators to determine the validity of the claim as long as the in-
vestigation was conducted in a legal manner. The Court held that,
since it appeared that the detectives violated a "peeping tom" stat-
ute, the investigation was not conducted within authorized legal
bounds and the defendant was subject to a suit for civil damages.
THE CALIFORNIA ATTITUDE
In a series of California cases, the courts have reviewed the
status of insurance companies and their duties to the insured and
the beneficiaries of insurance policies. In Crisci v. Security Insur-
ance Co." the California Supreme Court recognized that an insurer
owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of the bene-
fits of the policy. In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance
Company the court held: "We think that, similarly the implied in
law duty of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability
insurer the duty not to threaten to withhold or actually withhold
payments, maliciously and without probable cause, for the purpose
of injuring its insured by depriving him of the benefits of the pol-
icy." 9 It was held in Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company'° that an automobile liability insurer cannot,
after an automobile accident injuring a member of the public, in-
vestigate the insurability of its insured, and, finding uninsurability,
then deny coverage. The duty to the injured plaintiff was found
to have arisen out of the new "status" approach to insurance poli-
cies. The duty does not arise from contract. "There is a clear judi-
cial trend toward treating insurance policies more like 'commodi-
ties' than 'contracts' and toward imposing extracontractual obli-
gations on insurers on the basis of the expections of those with
whom they deal and the 'public service' nature of the function they
perform.""
In Unruh v. Truck Insurance Exchange12 the question posed was
whether the commission of negligent and intentional torts during
the investigation of a claim put the carrier beyond its proper role
as insurer into a different status unprotected by immunity.
It is true that compensation insurance carriers have the duty to
defend the employer and the right to conduct proper investigations
8. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, Conn., 66 Cal. 2d 425,
426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
9. Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
10. Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d
674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
11. Rintala, The Supreme Court of California in 1968-1969, 58 CAL. L.
REV. 80, 93 (1970).
12. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
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to that end, but they do not have the right to use excessive means,
which fall within the area of outrageous conduct.13
The Supreme Court in Redner v. Workmen's Compensation Ap-
peals Board14 found similar investigational tactics by the insurance
carrier to be "reprehensible" and held that motion pictures taken
during such an investigation were inadmissible at the Appeals
Board proceedings. Whether the compensation carrier could be
treated as a third-party was not at issue.
THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
Before the Workmen's Compensation Act (the Roseberry Act) 15
was passed in 1917, an employee injured on the job had the right to
sue his employer for negligence. The employer had available the
defE-ses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the
negligence of a fellow employee, all of which barred recovery.
Proof of the plaintiff's claim was difficult and few cases were suc-
cessful. The financial consequence of injury to employees was dev-
astating, often causing families of the injured worker to rely on
_public relief.
The legislature sought to solve this socio-economic problem. A
no-fault principle was adopted with lack of proximate cause the
only real defense. Administration of industrial injury claims was
assigned to a commission which was designed to work quickly and
with a minimum of cost to the parties. Benefits included medical
treatment and support payments adequate to keep the employee
and his family off public dole during the period of cure and rehabil-
itation.
The substantive roles in the Workmen's Compensation scheme
are the injured employee-applicant, the employer-defendant, the
employer's compensation insurance carrier, and the treating doc-
tor. The employee is the beneficiary of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act; his welfare was the concern of the legislature. The em-
ployee is the workman, usually with a dependent family, whose
income is interrupted by injury during the course of his employ-
13. Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970).
14. Redner v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 83, 485 P.2d 799,
95 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1971).
15. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201 et seq. (West 1971).
ment. The employer pays the premium to the insurance carrier.
Immediately upon being notified of an injury, the employer re-
ports the facts to the State of California and the insurance carrier.
The carrier authorizes medical treatment at its expense and pays
temporary disability until the condition becomes permanent and
stationary. The employee then settles his claim with the carrier,
subject to approval by the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board, or the employee receives a permanent disability award
through litigation at the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board.
The award is payable semiweekly until fully paid. In proper cases
it may be paid in a lump sum. Cases in which there is disability
over 70% are given a lifetime pension. A lifetime medical award
is granted where indicated. It is not uncommon for serious cases to
involve substantial sums. The insurance carrier assumes all of the
responsibilities of the employer and negotiates with the employee
and defends the action.
The medical doctor occupies the fourth major role in the scheme.
He is usually an independent contractor employed by the carrier
to cure the patient. Not only does the physician treat the injured
employee on behalf of the employer and the insurance carrier, but
he evaluates the condition of the employee and his evaluation is
the basis for an award at the Board. The physician usually bases
his evaluation upon medical records, upon reports of other doc-
tors who have seen the injured employee, and upon the patient's
complaints and history given to the doctor during a physical exami-
nation conducted by him. In order to supply the doctor with addi-
tional relevant information, the compensation carrier often investi-
gates the activities of the employee-applicant to verify the claimed
disability. Motion pictures are sometimes taken which are exhib-
ited to the examining doctor who may then find a basis for lower-
ing the estimated disability rating. Applicants may be consciously
or unconsciously freer in their movements when they are not aware
of detection. When the thought of litigation is heavy upon the
mind of an applicant while in the doctor's office, he may tend to
emphasize his complaints because of their importance to the final
outcome. Exaggeration may be voluntary or involuntary. Doc-
tors apparently find that if they can distract the patient, the pa-
tient will, while unguarded, perform motions which are otherwise
guarded either for fear of pain or voluntary concealment. This
complicated picture of human behavior is further obscured by the
element of motivation. The direct concern with financial gain is
always involved and may affect, to some degree, the truth.
Investigators have -found that they can obtain better sub rosa
results if they completely
.
distract the claimant by some device.
[voL. 1: 54, 1973] Insurance Carrier's Torts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The boundaries of imagination have been the only limitation.
Compensation investigators and private detectives have used every
conceivable trick and device to entice, to entrap, and to "rope"
the claimant into an onstage performance. Examples of roping
are many, including the use of an ice pick to puncture the
tire of an employee, claiming back injury, who is then photo-
graphed repairing the tire, squatting and lifting it in a manner
inconsistent with his professed disability. "Private eyes" have
rung door bells, dropped syrup in a bottle on the front porch
causing the injured lady of the house to stoop and bend before
the camera. A free brick patio with barbeque was offered one
claimant as a neighborhood advertisement if he installed the patio
himself.
Investigation techniques have been known to cause injury to the
applicant. Many employees have told of injury in the doctor's of-
fice due to over-rigorous examination. These aggravations have
been held to be compensable. In the event of a breach of duty by
the employer, the carrier, or the doctor, there are various avenues
of recourse open to the injured employee in California.
THE IMMUNITY QUESTION
The employer is granted complete statutory immunity for his
tortious acts except for the exclusive remedy under the Workmen's
Compensation law. 16 The employer's immunity is extended to the
carrier by statute.'7 But section 3852 of the California Labor Code
provides that all other persons may be liable to the injured em-
ployee for damages in civil actions. The doctor has no immunity
and is liable for his tortious acts.' 8
When an injured party sits down with his attorney to discuss
his legal rights, the attorney often advises the injured employee
that Workmen's Compensation is all he can collect from the em-
ployer and the insurance carrier. However, the attorney will look
for the elements of third party liability. This vast area of liability
includes the treating doctor, the hospital, the product manufacturer
and supplier, the general contractor, the sub-contractor, the en-
gineer, governmental entities, owners and occupiers of land, and
anyone else who commits a tortious act.
16. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West 1971).
17. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3850 (West 1971).
18. Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
Can a compensation carrier be a third party? The problem has
arisen in the treatment cases. The compensation carrier commonly
instructs a treating doctor to terminate treatment. This lay deci-
sion often negligently causes an aggravation of injuries and the
employee wants to file suit against the carrier. California cases
have held that a compensation carrier cannot be a third party be-
cause of the immunity statutes.19 In Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity and
Casualty20 the injured employee was held to have a remedy against
the physician for malpractice, but not against the carrier. The
courts have stated that to hold the carrier liable for negligence,
or conspiracy to deny treatment, would cause the compensation sys-
tem to break down.21
Furthermore, the Workmen's Compensation Law provides ade-
quate remedies to an injured employee when treatment is inade-
quate or is withheld. The employee has the right to obtain his
own medical treatment and to seek reimbursement for the ex-
pense in proper proceedings before the Appeals Board. He can also
ask for penalties. These remedies are adequate, and if properly
exercised, the employee will not suffer from inadequate or wrong-
ful treatment without recourse, either against the carrier or against
the negligent doctor.22
Suits have been brought against the compensation carrier for
injuries arising out of the carrier's negligent inspection of premises
pursuant to contract between the carrier and the employer. The
courts have held that safety inspections are beneficial to employees
and should be encouraged as a matter of public policy, and that
the role of the compensation carrier includes safety inspection.
Therefore, as to the carrier's negligent acts of inspection, statutory
immunity applied. 23
THE DILEMMA IN UNRUH
In the Unruh case, the Supreme Court could have held that the
investigational injury was non-industrial in the first place and
that there was no remedy under the Workmen's Compensation
19. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3861 & 3850 (West 1971).
20. Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity and Cos. Co. of N.Y., 7 Cal. 2d 230, 60 P.2d 276
(1936); see also, Heaton v. Kerlan, 27 Cal. 2d 716, 166 P.2d 857 (1946);
Dodds v. Stellar, 30 Cal. 2d 496 ,183 P.2d 658 (1947).
21. Noe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959).
22. Hazelwerdt v. Industrial Ind. Exch., 157 Cal. App. 2d 759, 321 P.2d
831 (1958); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4800.
23. State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Superior Ct. for Cnty. of Siskiyou, 237
Cal. App. 2d 416, 46 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1965); Burns v. State Comp. Ins. Fund,
265 Cal. App. 2d 98, 71 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1968).
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law.24 After all, the injury complained of occurred in April of
1964, whereas the original injury was in March of 1960. The in-
jured party was not an employee at the time of her 1964 injury.
She had not been employed in the interval. It was alleged that the
injuries complained of took place at Disneyland and at the Indus-
trial Accident Commission in Long Beach, California, far removed
from her place of original employment in Sun Valley, California.
Many cases have held post-accident aggravations connected with
the processing of industrial claims are compensable, and it is de-
sirable that they should be since benefits under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law are usually quickly provided. As a practical mat-
ter, the Industrial Accident Commission had already found Mrs. Un-
ruh's psychiatric injury to be industrial and she received an award
of compensation and medical benefits in excess of $200,000. If the
Supreme Court now held that the aggravation injury was non-
compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Law in order to
create a third party liability remedy, Mrs. Unruh would face the hor-
rible possibility that she would have to reimburse the compensa-
tion carrier the benefits mistakenly paid under the Workmen's
Compensation Law should she lose her tort action against the car-
rier. This would be a debt in excess of $200,000.
It becomes obvious that a distinction between negligent torts
and intentional torts would be productive. If the carrier were ex-
24. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 provides as follows:
Liability for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of
any other liability whatsoever to any person except as provided in§ 3706, shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an em-
ployer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of
and in the course of the employment and for the death of any
employee if the injury proximately casues death, in those cases
where the following conditions of compensation concur:
(a) Where, at the time of the injury, both the employer and the
employee are subject to the compensation provisions of this di-
vision.(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing
service growing out of and incidental to his employment and
is acting within the course of his employment.
(c) Where the injury is proximately caused by the employment,
either with or without negligence.(d) Where the injury is not caused by the intoxication of the in-jured employee.(e) Where the injury is not intentionally self-inflicted.
CAL. LAB. CODE, § 3602 provides as follows:
In all cases where the conditions of compensation do not concur,
the liability of the employer is the same as if this division had not
been enacted.
tended immunity only for its negligent acts, consistent with the
treatment and inspection cases, the Appeals Board would have ex-
clusive jurisdiction to award benefits; the objective of the legis-
lature would be fulfilled and the uniform and exclusive application
of the law would not become honeycombed with independent and
conflicting rules of the court as feared in Noe v. Travelers Insur-
ance Company.25 This would also avoid the specter of flooding
the courts with injury cases arising out of the handling of com-
pensation matters.
But by what device could the court hold that the plaintiff had a
cause of action that would afford her adequate relief for the inten-
tional tort, one to which the carrier was not immune, one which
would be consistent with her right to immediate benefits at the
Appeals Board and one which would be consistent with the pre-
vious cases in the medical and inspection areas? It was stated by
the court that excessive, outrageous conduct, which is not neces-
sary to protect the interests of the insurance industry, is conduct
outside of the role of the insurer under any concept.
26
THE SOLUTION
The answer is found in the fiction of dual capacity. This
device was created by the late Justice Peters in the case of Duprey
v. Shane.27 In Duprey the plaintiff, a nurse, sustained an indus-
trial injury while in the employ of the defendant, a chiropractor.
He undertook to treat the plaintiff for the injury and in so doing
aggravated it. Like Mrs. Unruh, the plaintiff sought and received
workmen's compensation benefits from the Board for the original
injury and also its aggravation. Thereafter, she brought an action
seeking damages for malpractice against her chiropractor-employer.
The court reasoned that "The employer-doctor is a 'person other
than the employer' within the meaning of section 3852 of the La-
bor Code. . . . In treating the injury, Dr. Shane did not do so be-
cause of the employer-employee relationship, but did so as an at-
tending doctor, and his relationship to . .. (the plaintiff) was that
of doctor and patient. ' 28 Duprey was allowed to file application for
adjudication of claim at the Industrial Accident Commission and also
to sue in the civil courts for negligence. Presumably a setoff pre-
cluded double recovery.
In Unruh the insurance carrier was, according to the complaint,
25. 172 Cal. App. 2d 731, 342 P.2d 976 (1959).
26. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 630, 498 P.2d 1063, 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825.
27. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
28. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d 8, 15.
[voL. 1: 54, 1973] Insurance Carrier's Torts
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
performing acts of investigation which appeared to fall within its
proper role as an insurance carrier. As such, it could not be said
that Truck Insurance Exchange changed from its role of carrier
into the role of another member of the compensation family as did
Dr. Shane when he changed from employer into treating doctor.
However, it was strenuously urged by Mrs. Unruh that Truck had
gone beyond the role of the insurance carrier by wantonly and in-
tentionally committing deceitful illegal acts beyond all propriety,
and had assumed the role of private investigator, an available third
party. The court rejected this argument because the carrier did
not change into another well-recognized role as in Duprey. 'How-
ever by donning the cloak of Svengalian deception, the carrier
looked like it was changing from a Dr. Jekyll into a Mr. Hyde, and
that was enough for the court:
. . we are unable to conclude that a compensation insurer re-
mains within its proper role as such, when, as in the instant case,
through its agents or others employed by it, such insurer inten-
tionally embarks upon a deceitful course of conduct in its investi-
gations which causes injury to the subject of the investigation.
We cannot give our approval to such misconduct which tramples
upon the employee's rights, by deeming it no more than the normal
behavior of the insurer. In Redner v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals
Bd., concerning similar investigatory conduct of a compensation
carrier, we said: "Evidence obtained by fraud and deceit in viola-
tion of the rights of the applicant, however, is not best calculated
to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and carry out
justly the spirit and provisions of the workmen's compensation
laws. The high purposes of the compensation law should not be
perverted by resort to evidence perfidiously procured." (Original
italics.) Our condemnation in Redner leaves no doubt that such
conduct goes beyond the normal role of an insurer in a compensa-
tion scheme intended to protect the worker. (Citations.) A de-
ceitful investigation, in place of an honest one, frustrates the--aud-
able objectives of the Workmen's Compensation law. Permitting
the employee to maintain an action at law for the insurer's inten-
tional torts will subserve these objectives but at the same time will
not discourage the insurer from fulfilling its proper role in the
compensation scheme.29
THE INCONGRUITY PROBLEM
Should the Supreme Court have limited Mrs. Unruh to recovery
against the carrier for its intentional torts only, and not for negli-
gence? The limitation has created
. 
serious incongruities.
29. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 630, 498 P.2d 1063, 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825 (1972).
In Duprey v. Shane, supra, the doctrine of dual capacity created
liability of the employer as a third party without limitation. Shane
was held liable as employer for compensation benefits and also as
a doctor for negligence. If the employer (Shane) acting as a doctor
commits a wilfull injury in the course of treatment, an apparent
dilemma arises. Azevedo v. Industrial Accident Commission 30 took
away the employee's previously recognized option to "go third-
party" against the assaulting employer for general and punitive
damages, and restricted him to the supposedly adequate remedy
for wilful misconduct provided under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion statute.3 1 Is this a bar to a civil action for punitive damages
in a dual capacity case? Theoretically not. Dual capacity created
from one entity two distinct entities not "privy" to themselves.
32
It would not be inconsistent to allow a cause of action against
"Shane, the doctor" for malpractice, negligent and wilful, with
punitive damages, and at the same time the administrative remedy
of compensation and the punitive award provided by Labor Code
section 4553 against "Shane, the employer", subject to a setoff to
avoid double recovery.
It is obvious that dual capacity creates "partial disintegration"
of the compensation system. The rule of application must be one
of selectivity.
The immunity statutes 33 seem to equate the employer to the
carrier, one having the same immunity as the other, neither greater
nor less. Yet, the legislature failed to mention the carrier in Sec-
tion 4553 of the California Labor Code, which provided a remedy
against the employer for wilful misconduct. The implication is
that the legislature intended to leave intact a common law action
against the carrier for its intentional torts, while consuming the
negligence of both in the heat that forged the compensation law.
This may represent a fair view of the original intent, but the doc-
trine of dual capacity resulted in a fracture across the structure.
Shane was held for simple negligence. Does it not follow that
where the carrier acts in a dual capacity, it should also be liable
for its negligence? The court said no in Unruh, and as a result
the carrier has greater immunity than the employer. This is in-
congruous!
The plaintiff in Unruh proposed to the court that while carriers
act as carriers when they investigate claims, they act in the dual
30. Axevedo v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 243 Cal. App. 2d 370, 52 Cal. Rptr.
283 (1966).
31. CAL. LAB .CODE, § 4553 (West 1971).
32. See section on Res Judicata, infra.
33. CAL. LAB. CODE, §§ 3850 & 3852 (West 1971).
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capacity of private investigators when they engage in elaborate
"rope" subterfuges. The court refused to take judicial notice of
this fact and rejected the idea of a lateral shift of personality.
As private investigators, a commonly recognized distinct role, the
carrier would have been a third party and like Shane, the doctor,
liable for negligence.
The Supreme Court felt it was committed to follow the treat-
ment and inspection cases in disposing of negligence. It is true that
carriers investigate, provide treatment and inspect places of em-
ployment. But the plaintiff argued that the policy considerations
in the treatment cases have no application in the investigation
cases. It is probably true that if carriers were liable for negligent
treatment, multitudes of actions would clog the courts. It seems
the Appeals Board is better geared to handle these post-accident
aggravations inherent in the treatment cases. Non-medical inves-
tigations on the other hand produce few injuries and liability for
negligence would not strain the courts. It apparently was difficult
for the court to distinguish between medical investigation and
non-medical investigation.
In disposing of negligence, the court dealt with the following
realities: First, there was, in its opinion, no lateral shift in capac-
ity; it was vertical. The carrier was not acting like anyone else
in the compensation scheme. Its wrong was one of excess. Sec-
ond, the employer does not by excess become a third party. His
liability for intentional torts is limited to the penalty in California
Labor Code section 4553. In an attempt to equalize the immunity,
the court limited the carrier's liability to recovery for the excess
and not for negligence. Third, the torts involved in non-medical
investigation are by their very nature intentional torts of deceit,
invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, assault and
battery and conspiracy. To give redress for these torts affords
ample remedy. Furthermore, all injuries sustained during the un-
folding of the conspiracy may be actionable regardless of fault un-
der Workmen's Compensation Law. Fourth, it is more consistent
to hold the carrier liable for its intentional torts in all spheres
of activity, such as treatment, inspection and investigation, etc.,
rather than to find immunity in some and not others.
RES JUDICATA
Proceedings at the Appeals Board are res judicata and a bar to
proceedings between the same parties in subsequent actions.8 4 This
intriguing problem appeared insurmountable in Unruh. However,
the court simply stated that Truck Insurance Exchange which al-
legedly caused psychiatric injury by intentional tort, was not the
same Truck Insurance Exchange that defended the Workmen's
Compensation action. Res judicata only involved the same parties
or their privies. Truck, the intentional tortfeasor, was not privy
to Truck, the compensation carrier. Therefore, there was no bar.
Setoff solved the problem of double recovery.
The formidable election of remedies defense did not exist, said
the court, because plaintiff sued for a subsequent injury, not the
initial injury, and because the Truck Insurance Exchange which
she sued in the compensation case was not the same Truck Insur-
ance Exchange she had sued in the third party action.
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEES OF THE CARRIER
Unruh joined as defendants the Claims Supervisor of the Com-
pensation Carrier and the Independent Investigator, as individuals.
It was claimed that the Supervisor failed to advise the Investigator
of the psychiatric background of the subject, that he was aware of
the type of investigation employed by the investigator, yet directed
the sub rosa investigation to be conducted and further directed
the movies to be shown. The court found that although the em-
ployer and the carrier are synonymous, the employees of the com-
pensation carrier are not co-employees of the plaintiff and do not,
therefore, have the partial immunity given co-employees. 35
34. Scott v. Ind. Acc. Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956).
35. CAL. LAB. CODE, § 3601(a) (West 1971) as follows:
Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to recover
such compensation, pursuant to the provisions of this division is,
except as provided in § 3706, exclusive remedy for injury or
death of an employee against the employer or against any other
employee of the employer acting within the scope of his employ-
ment, except that an employee, or his dependents, in the event of
his death, shall, in addition to the right to compensation against
the employer, have a right to bring an action at law for damages
against such other employee, as if this division did not apply, in
either of the following cases:(1) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the will-
ful and unprovoked physical act of aggression of such other
employee.(2) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the intoxi-
cation of such other employee.(3) In no event, either by legal action or by agreement, whether
entered into by such other employee or on his behalf, shall
the employer be held liable, directly or indirectly, for damages
awarded against, or for a liability incurred by such other em-
ployee under paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) of this
section.
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Although this decision was made in an investigation case,
the broad issue is clearly stated by the court in Unruh: "We must
decide whether the carrier which commits an intentional tort be-
comes a 'person other than the employer.'-3" This can only mean
that a compensation carrier may be liable for all its intentional
torts regardless of the activity.
2. It would seem to follow that wilful failure to provide bene-
fits could create third party liability,3T However, remedies already
exist at the Appeals Board in the form of penalties for this inten-
tional act.
3. Under what circumstances can the carrier be liable in inspec-
tion cases? It would seem that if the carrier undertakes the duty
of inspection, becomes aware of a dangerous condition and takes
no steps to remedy the condition; or is aware that safety orders are
being violated and does nothing; or if the safety inspector recom-
mends safety precautions which in themselves lead to injury, the
carrier should be held liable on the basis of wanton misconduct ap-
proaching the quality of an intentional tort.38
4. Holding the employee of the carrier liable for his own negli-
gence is significant new law. The immunity of the carrier from
negligence does not protect the employee of the carrier. The car-
rier, a corporation or inter-insurance exchange, necessarily acts
through its employees. If the carrier is immune when it negligently
provides treatment, fails to provide treatment, withholds compen-
sation benefits, inspects premises, investigates claims, or performs
any other act, the employee is not immune. Therefor, all negli-
gence actions heretofore brought, without success, against the car-
rier can now be brought against the individual employee of the
carrier.
5. The unharnessed investigation of claimants in some cases has
been shocking, even where immunity does not exist. With immu-
nity, the investigator could be downright unscrupulous and could
36. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 630, 498 P.2d 1063, 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825 (1972).
37. Fletcher v. Western Nat. Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 78 (1970).
38. Levizon v. Harrison, 198 Cal. App. 2d 274, 18 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1962).Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
indeed intentionally injure a claimant with impunity. That power
has not been taken away by Unruh.
6. The duality concept may be useful in creating negligence lia-
bility in other areas even if rejected by the Supreme Court for
negligent torts in the Unruh case. Anyone who steps outside or
beyond the status role which is privileged or immune may lose that
privilege or immunity. If the employer acts in a dual capacity when
it treats 9 or when it provides treatment by the company doctor 40
the employer is liable as a third party for injuries arising out of
the negligent treatment thus provided.
7. The Unruh decision demonstrates the willingness of the Su-
preme Court to provide new remedies when needed. The future
course of these new liabilities will be worth watching.
39. Hoffman v. Rogers, 22 Cal. App. 3d 655, 99 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1972).
